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Casualties are estimated for the 12 January 2010 earthquake in Haiti using various
reports calibrated by observed building damage states from satellite imagery and re-
connaissance reports on the ground. By investigating various damage reports, casu-
alty estimates and burial figures, for a one year period from 12 January 2010 until5
12 January 2011, there is also strong evidence that the official government figures of
316 000 total dead and missing, reported to have been caused by the earthquake, are
significantly overestimated. The authors have examined damage and casualties report
to arrive at their estimation that the median death toll is less than half of this value
(±137 000). The authors show through a study of historical earthquake death tolls, that10
overestimates of earthquake death tolls occur in many cases, and is not unique to Haiti.
As death toll is one of the key elements for determining the amount of aid and recon-
struction funds that will be mobilized, scientific means to estimate death tolls should be
applied. Studies of international aid in recent natural disasters reveal that large distri-
butions of aid which do not match the respective needs may cause oversupply of help,15
aggravate corruption and social disruption rather than reduce them, and lead to distrust
within the donor community.
1 Introduction
A day after the great Haiti earthquake, the country’s president, René Préval, speculated
that 30 000–50 000 people (CNN, 2010) may have died based on Haitian Red Cross20
and World Health Organization (WHO) estimates – though officials conceded there was
no real way to make an estimate amid the chaos in the poorest country in the West-
ern Hemisphere. Nearly three months after the 12 January 2010 Haiti Earthquake, the
latest government-released death toll estimates were between 222 500 and 300 000
(SNGRD, 2010a; USAID, 2010a; Al Jazeera, 2010). The shaking of the Moment Mag-25






































significant and caused widespread destruction of buildings in towns like Léogâne and
Carrefour, as well as major destruction within the poorly-constructed and densely-
packed Port-au-Prince metropolitan area only 30 km from the earthquake hypocenter
(USGS, 2010a).
Several conditions further exacerbated the impact of the earthquake in terms of in-5
creased casualties. The non-seismic construction standards and little enforcement of
building codes in most cases led to very poor earthquake performance. Unsafe con-
struction practices were so pervasive that they even crossed socio-economic bound-
aries; poorly constructed cinder block buildings collapsed during the earthquake, as
did Port-au-Prince luxury hotels and the United Nations (UN) mission headquarters.10
Certainly some of the lives lost in the rubble could have been saved if effective urban
search-and-rescue teams and emergency medical units were available in the impacted
areas within the first few critical hours following the earthquake. In Haiti, disruptions in
critical infrastructure (telecommunications, electrical networks, transport facilities and
hospitals) and absence of a coordinated response arrangement further undermined15
the search and rescue effort, and significantly impacted the number of people rescued
from the rubble.
Studies of search and rescue efforts after earthquakes indicate that less than 50 %
of people buried under collapsed buildings will still be alive two to six hours after en-
trapment (De Bruycker et al., 1983). Haiti, unlike China where a very strong military re-20
sponse was mobilized within minutes, simply did not have the resources to act quickly,
and it took time for foreign aid to arrive. Furthermore, the dense urban environment
in Port-au-Prince made it a difficult place for rescue teams to work in once they were
there. In China, machines and methods to remove debris, tents and support systems
were in place quickly and many decentralized stations were mobilized allowing for relief25
staff to effectively undertake recovery and rescue.
Given a large-scale urban earthquake and conditions that exacerbated the initial
impact of the catastrophic earthquake in Haiti, death toll estimates of up to 6 % of






































may not seem very surprising. Nevertheless, casualty rates that would be expected
from the observed building damages (EC-JRC, 2010a; Eberhard et al., 2010; Rathje
et al., 2010) and verified burial statistics (Melissen, 2010) do not correspond with
government-released casualty and missing rates, even when accounting for all the
aggravating conditions present in Haiti that could lead to increased death tolls.5
2 Methodology
Given the large range of available data, the following methodology was followed in
order to assess the best death toll estimate for the Haiti earthquake of 2010:
1. The damage data estimates of the original damage estimates from the time of
the original death tolls were compared to the MTPTC ground survey tagging of10
buildings.
2. A realistic and justified range of damage data is then created.
3. The death toll ranges of the Haiti government and other source estimates over
the time period were compared.
4. Various occupancy assumptions and building losses are compared to the death15
toll estimates.
5. These are then compared to create an estimate allowing for the range of uncer-
tainty shown in the death toll releases.
By using historical data from every damaging earthquake recorded worldwide, the
range of death tolls is then compared to historical estimates with a focus on the range20






































3 Post-earthquake damage in Haiti
It has been found through CATDAT, that where secondary effects of earthquakes do
not occur, nearly 100 % of deaths are due to building collapse in earthquakes with over
1000 deaths. Thus, it is important to quantify the building damage to gain an insight
into the Haiti death toll.5
The worldwide CATDAT damaging earthquakes and secondary effects (tsunami, fire,
landslides, liquefaction and fault rupture) database was developed to validate, remove
discrepancies and expand greatly upon existing global earthquake databases; and to
better understand the trends in vulnerability, exposure and possible future impacts of
such historical earthquakes (Daniell, 2010a; Daniell et al., 2011). This is further ex-10
plained in Sect. 5.
As expected, the damage reports that came out after the Haiti earthquake via remote
sensing pointed to high-density urban areas such as Port-au-Prince for the greatest ob-
served damage density (EC-JRC, 2010a). The Post Disaster Needs Assessment and
Recovery Framework Report (PDNA) combined the findings of a validated building15
damage assessment, using work from a variety of NGOs, organizations, governments,
consortia and companies on the ground. The government also released their own es-
timates during the death toll estimate stage.
The latest and most accurate survey is that of the ground survey of USAID/OFDA
and Miyamoto International for the MTPTC by 554 Haitian Engineers who have tagged20
400 000 buildings as to habitability (MTPTC, 2011). Of the building stock audited,
80 000 of these were tagged red (reconstruction necessary) and around 120 000 yel-
low tagged (indicating work required but safe), 200 000+ buildings have been green
tagged.
Of the 20 % red tagged buildings, some had completely collapsed, but many re-25
mained stable enough for life safety. The 30 % of yellow tagged buildings will be able to







































The downtown and commercial buildings had about 25 % destruction rate and 45 %
moderate-heavy damage; however, these buildings do not make up a significant per-
centage of total building floor area (approximately 12 % of Port-au-Prince, 1–3 % in
other major centers like Carrefour, Delmas93 and less than 1 % in all other areas)
in other earthquake-affected locations in Haiti. Shanty towns and the biggest slum in5
Port-au-Prince, Cité Soleil, were also reported to have experienced high damage levels
(15 % destroyed and 20 % moderate-heavy damage). In spite of the extensive damage
in these areas, casualties were less due to the use of less vulnerable building methods
such as utilizing sheet metal as roofing and one-storey construction (EC-JRC, 2010a).
Casualties due to damages in rural areas, such as Jacmel and other parts of Carrefour,10
Léogâne, Grand-Goâve, Gressier and the Sud-Est provinces were reported to be much
less (EC-JRC, 2010a,b; Melissen 2010; SNGRD, 2010b; OCHA, 2010a).
Although it is impossible to convert building damage levels to tagging levels di-
rectly, assumptions have been made to undertake this. The red tagged buildings were
distributed using all EMS-98, completely destroyed and severely damaged buildings.15
For the Haiti Government estimate through the last available SNGRD report, 105 369
buildings were reported to be destroyed, and 208 164 damaged. Of the destroyed, all
were assumed to be red. For the damaged buildings however, they include all damage
classes – thus, a value of 15 % damaged buildings were added into red buildings, 70 %
of these damaged were assumed to be yellow, and 15 % assumed to be green. We20
assume 400 000 buildings as the building count.
Given that the final distribution values of the Miyamoto International damage are
not available, as well as the exact values of the Government of Haiti data, we attempt
to distribute the building losses of moderate-heavy damage and destroyed buildings
over the various locations into red building classes. Given that red tagged buildings25
by definition are those unsafe, we assume that nearly all deaths occur in these red
buildings. They are then adapted with respect to the UNOSAT damage reports.
The observed building damages (from several reports calculated via visual inspec-






































estimates from both the government and aid organizations are presented for the earth-
quake affected area in Table 1 for the Port-au-Prince area but also all affected towns
and cities. The difference in building damage percentages from the PDNA study (cov-
ering approximately 3.1 million of the 3.6 million affected population) from those of gov-
ernment are staggering: the government reports of up to 250 000 houses and 30 0005
commercial buildings collapsed (Renois, 2010) seem very large considering a PDNA
total damage estimate of less than 25 000 buildings destroyed including approx. 3000
commercial buildings (EC-JRC, 2010a). The GEO-CAN effort via remote sensing also
shows a large difference from that of the government estimate for Port-au-Prince and
other towns as shown in the values of Table 1 (ImageCat et al., 2010).10
The building damages can also be compared to the building and demographic
census of Haiti (IHSI, 2010a,b) and calibrated against photographic evidence from
UNOSAT and other ground-based studies (EC-JRC, 2010a,b; Eberhard et al., 2010;
Rathje et al., 2010). These UNOSAT values (ImageCAT et al., 2010) have been in-
vestigated by Spence and Saito (2010) using a validation of a small subset of data15
(approx. 1200 buildings), showing that using Pictometry, a value of up to 50 % more
destroyed and heavily damaged buildings could result. In terms of ground observation,
a small subset of buildings (124) were investigated for damage class and it was shown
with extrapolation it could be expected that the UNOSAT values could be doubled to
give a reasonable estimate of destroyed and heavily damaged buildings (Spence and20
Saito, 2010). The final UNOSAT values however show reasonable correlation with the
red tagging of the full ground survey and show that only a 20 % increase in values is
expected (Table 2).
It is shown that the Haitian government estimates through SNGRD were about






































4 Death toll estimates in Haiti
A lower bound estimate of 52 000–92 000 deaths was presented by Melissen in 2010
and the highest consistent bound estimate of 316 000 was presented by the Prime
Minister of the Government of Haiti on 12 January 2011 at the 1 yr anniversary donor
conference.5
Considering the existing building stock and extent of damage, even when account-
ing for increased casualties due to factors such as initial injury severity, effective search
and rescue, and fade-away time due to delays in extrication and transport to medical fa-
cilities, there are several other factors as to why the released higher death tolls may be
unrealistic apart from the building damage overestimation by the Haitian government:10
1. despite being ill-equipped to handle the rescue of victims, the use of community
involvement in rescue cannot be ignored and studies have shown that over 90 %
of lightly trapped victims still alive are rescued by people at the scene of collapse
(Krimgold, 1989);
2. casualties and the degree of entombment by collapsed structures are correlated15
with building material and building height (Schweier et al., 2006), and the single-
storey buildings and lighter buildings which make up most of the urban building
stock in Haiti (IHSI, 2010a, b) should produce fewer casualties;
3. the earthquake luckily occurred at 4.53 p.m. when many people were outside and
travelling from work or school to home and/or outside playing and talking. Thus,20
a good proportion of the population of Haiti in both urban and rural areas were
likely able to survive through the earthquake, even if their houses in some cases
were reduced to rubble.
On the contrary, it is noted that:
1. some proportion of deaths would occur in injured rescued people even given com-25







































2. In addition, the single-storey buildings sometimes do have concrete slab roofs
contributing to increased deaths, and also there would be higher death tolls in
multi-storey buildings.
For these reasons, it was decided to delve deeper into the possible anomalies between
the death toll from external analyses and those of the government of Haiti (222 570 or5
316 000). Government-released death toll estimates, as well as those given by news
reports and aid organizations, were examined since the earthquake hit on 12 January
2010 (Fig. 1). These figures are mainly from Marie-Laurence Lassegue, Haiti’s Culture
and Communications Minister; René Préval, Haiti’s President; and official government
press communiqués via the SNGRD (The National Risk and Disaster Management10
Agency). In the initial days following the earthquake, government estimates of potential
fatalities varied from at least 100 000 (Jean Max Bellerive, Haitian Prime Minister, CNN,
2010a) to 500 000 deaths (Youri Latortue, a leading Haitian Senator, CBS, 2010).
The initial government reports were downscaled after the release of a Haitian Red
Cross and Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO) reports of potential death tolls of15
between 40 000 to 50 000 (CBS, 2010; PAHO, 2010). The first “official” government es-
timate from the SNGRD (based on estimates of buried bodies) came one week after the
earthquake on 17 January 2010 and reported fatalities of 65 000–75 000 (with 250 000
injured and over 1 million homeless, USAID, 2010b; SNGRD, 2010c). By 21 January,
however, the SNGRD death toll estimates increased to 111 481 (a rise of 36 000 from20
the previous day, SNGRD, 2010c,d) but stayed fairly constant with only slight changes
until 5 February (SNGRD, 2010e). At this point, the death toll for the town of Tabarre
was at 7000.
Interestingly, on 6 February the SNGRD report (SNGRD, 2010f) increased both the
death toll and injury estimates by the same value (approximately 100 000) to 212 06925
deaths and 300 572 injuries. This may not be unrelated to the reports of death tolls
by other government officials, such as estimates of 150 000 fatalities by Haiti’s Public
Works Department (Centre Nationale des Equipments) on 23 January (SNGRD, 2010f;






































2010) and a death toll announced by Prime Minister Jean-Max Bellerive of 200 000
people on 3 February (USAID, 2010c). The government death toll reports continued to
rise sharply from 230 000 deaths on 10 February by Marie-Laurence Lassegue (Bajak
et al., 2010) to 300 000 deaths on 21 February by René Préval (Al Jazeera, 2010). The
SNGRD casualty estimates remained at approximately 223 000 deaths from 21 Febru-5
ary 2010 (SNGRD, 2010g) to 5 April 2010, where the death toll for the town of Tabarre
had reduced 70 times, to 100.
Whatever the official death toll, by this time, according to data from cemetery of-
ficials in the main cemetery of Port-au-Prince, only 18 000 bodies had been buried
(Melissen, 2010), as compared to 89 000 buried bodies in the main cemetery quoted10
by Jean-Yves Jason, the Port-au-Prince mayor (Beauchemin, 2010). An independent
investigation into the reported death tolls by Hans Jaap Melissen from Radio Nether-
lands Worldwide claimed that as of 23 February, an estimate of between 52 000 and
92 000 deaths was the most accurate estimate (Table 3). There is a striking difference of
131 500 casualties between the unexplained Haiti government (SNGRD) estimates of15
223 469 and that of the figures by Radio Netherlands Worldwide. The Melissen (2010)
range also accounted for cremated, mass graves, suicides, those never found and al-
ternatively buried deaths.
Since then, at the 1 yr anniversary meeting of the Haiti Earthquake in which dig-
nitaries like former US President Bill Clinton were at, the Prime Minister Jean-Max20
Bellerive announced a total of 316 000 deaths. This is a total of 93 000 more deaths
since the 1 April 2010, thus accounting for 327 bodies found or measured every day
since then, if the original Haitian government death toll is to be used.
During analysis of historic death tolls through the use of CATDAT (Daniell, 2003–
2013), it can be seen that many initial death tolls can be multiplied by 3 to approximate25
the final death toll. This would make approximately 135 000 to 150 000, using the initial
PAHO and UN estimates.
Above, the range of estimates can be seen in Fig. 1. If we correlate these estimates






































A top-down and bottom-up approach can be used. It can be assumed that the errors
in death counts are associated also with double-counting, and the fact officials were
overwhelmed by the extent of the disaster.
Given the number of bodies needed to be found since 1 April, and the historic over-
estimate of Renois quoting 280 000 buildings destroyed, it can be assumed that the5
value of 316 000 deaths is an aberration. Instead we correlate the value of 222 570
(+869 missing) deaths to the building damage associated with the Government of Haiti
as a first estimate (136 593 buildings red-tagged).
In a more qualitative bottom-up approach, it is the opinion of the authors, using
damage data, that the loss estimate via other death methods such as cremation was10
closer to 20 000. In addition, death tolls in Port-au-Prince area (Port-au-Prince, Delmas,
Petionville) should be estimated to be around 70 000 rather than 35 000 using higher
population density and destruction rates than in other locations (Melissen, 2010). If
approximately 40 000 people were under the rubble instead of the 30 000 detailed by
Melissen, distributed across the disaster area, a total value of up to 147 000 dead is15
found using the initial Melissen death tolls as a basis.
The final step in the process is then using the bottom up approach and top down
approach in order to work out the overestimate. We assume that the rescue and relief
components are in both of these estimates, as they are both from the end of February.
The actual value of red-tagged houses in Haiti was 80 000. A conservative assumption20
would be that the values are a maximum of 18 % underestimated by using the original
January values of UNOSAT.
Choosing building parameters as the difference between the two estimates, and us-
ing a sliding scale from the 136 593 red-tagged buildings assumed by the Haiti Gov-
ernment, where towns under 500 deaths are kept constant (apart from Grand-Goave),25
a value of 127 464 deaths results. We can assume two other boundaries using no dam-
aged buildings in the red-tag, and 25 % of buildings in red-tag. This gives a boundary






































In addition we can add 30 000 deaths, due to the possible value of found bodies
since 28 February 2010 as a found body count since and also for an increased number
of people dying due to their injuries since then. This gives a boundary of 126 209 to
186 157 deaths.
A logic tree approach will now be used to calculate the reasonable range of death5
tolls in Haiti as shown in Table 4. We also include a normalized version of Renois
using the 316 000 deaths stated but normalizing against comments of 225 000–280 000
destroyed buildings. This gives a range of 90 286 to 112 356 deaths.
The weighting of the Haiti government statement of 316 000 deaths, was so low due
to the historic error in their destroyed buildings statement and the fact that 327 bodies10
would have to have been pulled from the debris everyday since 1 April 2010, even
when quoted at 220 000–230 000 in late October. For Port-au-Prince this would add up
to around 211 000 deaths in this commune alone, and considering the 170 423 injured
in this commune also, would add up to 42 % of the pre-earthquake population, dead or
injured.15
The Haiti government statement adjusting for their error in destroyed buildings was
also given a low weighting due to the fact that the death toll and destroyed building
count were so high compared with the actual values by Miyamoto International, that no
degree of confidence could be given to such estimates.
Concurrently, the general rule of thumb is simply a trends analysis based on many20
different earthquakes, and given the difference in historic estimate ranges, this is also
given a low weighting.
It was decided that both the Melissen death toll and the Haiti death toll are equally
plausible when not looking at building counts and thus, these were both given equal
weighting.25
The bottom up approach uses Melissen as a basis, increasing the death toll for
parameters where the authors believe this was underestimated, having now a year






































However, the top down approach is by far the best, as it uses the Haiti government
detailed death toll for each commune and also the Miyamoto International actual build-
ing count as a basis, simply adjusting for the error in building count in the SNGRD
reports.
The highest ranking was given to the actual death count of the SNGRD, and as no5
increase has been given apart from the statements this is assumed the best starting
point. Thus the top-down approach was given a large percentage of the weighting. The
weighting is applied via expert opinion however, with additional expert input the results
would be slightly different.
Thus, the Haiti death toll is more likely to be 136 933, with a range of 121 843 to10
167 082 dead (Table 4).
5 The historical difficulties with death toll counts
Over 22 000 sources of information have been utilised since 2003 to present data
from over 12 400 damaging earthquakes historically, with over 7200 earthquakes since
1900 examined and validated before insertion into the CATDAT Damaging Earthquakes15
database (Daniell et al., 2011). Since 1900, there have been over 2000 fatal earth-
quakes worldwide and over 3000 casualty-bearing earthquakes. Each validated earth-
quake includes seismological information, secondary effects (social, economic and
type), building damage (levels, important infrastructure etc.), ranges of social losses
to account for varying sources (deaths, injuries, homeless and affected) and ranges of20
economic losses (direct, indirect, aid contribution and insurance details). Much other
economic and population analysis is also included in the database, as well as socio-
economic vulnerability trends and normalisation analysis with automatic updating via
earthquake-report.com (Daniell et al., 2012).
Through history using CATDAT, there have been many other discrepancies of earth-25
quake death counts which occurred in the early period following a disaster, either un-






































1948, Romania 1977) or overestimates (China 1927, Tajikistan 1949, Chile 1960 and
Tangshan 1976) due to sheer enormity of the unexpected impact of earthquakes on
the government and government agencies themselves, or a simple inability to calcu-
late the death count, or a need to evoke aid (Daniell, 2010b; Ramirez et al., 2005).
A selection of these is shown in Table 5 below. Early casualty estimates after natural5
disasters are typically not very reliable as they are based on guesswork of casualties
in affected neighborhoods, and the widespread infrastructure damage makes it diffi-
cult to count bodies (Alexander, 1996, 1993, 1985). Nevertheless, the death tolls along
with the number of injured and homeless people establish the scale of the disaster and
are critical in establishing the basis of the immediate and reconstruction aid appeal10
(Cavallo et al., 2010).
In Fig. 2 below, 147 earthquakes with an accepted death toll of 1000 persons or more
according to the median CATDAT accepted death toll are presented on the x-axis. This
value represents the most likely death toll when looking at all literature values with
each of these earthquakes. Shown on the y-axis is the upper bound (diamond) and15
lower bound (square) literature value (with removal of obvious errors) from various
global sources. Where there is not much variability, the upper and lower bound value
should lie on the middle black line. Where there is a deemed overestimated death toll
in literature sources the earthquake appears as a diamond above the accepted me-
dian line. Where there is a deemed underestimated death toll in literature sources the20
earthquake appears as a square below the accepted median line (Daniell et al., 2011).
Earthquakes can have a wide range of death toll estimates so in some cases, such as
the Shemakha 1902 earthquake, both the upper and lower estimate can be deemed
as over- and underestimates on a true death toll. A death toll as low as 86 (NGDC,
2010) and as high as 20 000 (London Times, 1902), with a CATDAT accepted median25
death toll of 2000 results. The Xining earthquake of 1927 is another such earthquake
with a range of between 40 900 (Gu et al., 1989) and 200 000 (EM-DAT).
Estimates by the UN’s Office for Coordinating Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the or-






































identified by all agencies, are often higher than the local government’s as the UN tries
to account for regions that have not yet been assessed on the ground by using satel-
lite footage of the wreckage and prior demographic information (Lapados, 2010). Even
without such projections, UN numbers are often higher because they err on the side
of overestimation to ensure an adequate relief response. This also usually includes5
a certain amount of aid to reduce disease outbreak. In the case of Haiti, contaminating
drinking water sources contributed to the outbreak with an estimated 1000+ deaths.
As yet, UN/OCHA has used the unexplained estimates of the SNGRD and other
government representatives from 16 January onwards. More concerning is perhaps
the precise use of unverified casualty estimates in determining the reconstruction aid.10
The IADB calculated a bottom line of US$ 7200 million (2009 dollars) for a death toll
of 200 000 and US$ 8100 million for a death toll of 250 000 in direct economic dam-
ages after the Haiti earthquake (Cavallo et al., 2010). The IADB calculations based
on death toll estimates are useful for putting the importance of casualty estimates into
perspective as a parameter for ultimately determining the basis of the reconstruction15
funds. The exaggerated mortality figures were also picked up by media outlets, most of
which do not have the resources to verify the casualty estimates independently. Stud-
ies of mass-media content analysis (Adames, 1986) have found that the three most
important factors (accounting for over 60 % of the variation out of 16 factors) that ex-
plain US media attention devoted to a natural disaster were: (1) cultural proximity and20
social interest (i.e. number of US tourists); (2) estimated disaster deaths (modified by
a logarithmic scale); and (3) geographical proximity (i.e. distance from New York City).
When these factors come together, as in the case of Haiti, they can lead to a so-called
“telegenic” effect which has the potential to lead to an outpouring of immediate altruistic
giving in the aftermath of an event.25
Certainly, even a fraction of the reported casualties constitutes a large human
tragedy and undeniably a country like Haiti is in “need of all the help it can get”. Yet,
it can be argued that more aid is not always “too much of a good thing”, and in cases






































of the most vulnerable populations. For example, the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami
$ 14 000 million aid which surpassed the total estimated cost of damages by about
30 % was found to “exceed the absorption capacity of an overstretched humanitarian
industry” (Ville de Goyet et al., 2010). In this case, outpouring of disaster donations has
been found to have such adverse impacts as promotion of funding decisions based on5
media and political pressure rather than actual needs or capacity, competition among
aid agencies and disincentives for them to pool resources and information, prolifera-
tion of inexperienced NGOs and actors working outside their area of expertise, and
weakening of humanitarian impartiality.
In the initial period following a disaster, the abundance of supplies cluttering infras-10
tructure vital to delivering aid, further aggravate the incapacity to absorb aid. Many of
these supplies have not been requested and are not useful or of first priority to cover
the needs of an emergency. In addition, they compromise the efficient reception, stor-
age, classification, control and distribution of these supplies, consuming relief workers’
scarce time and resources. There have already been reports of unneeded and unso-15
licited donations creating bottlenecks at Haiti’s strained airport (Freschi, 2010). These
differences between the physical and community vulnerability of a disaster may aggra-
vate the physical many times over (Daniell et al, 2010a).
Finally, soaring funding levels and pressure to spend, combined with reduced finan-
cial controls and quick turn-over in staff, provide fertile ground for corruption in emer-20
gency procurement which ultimately diverts aid from those who need it most (Cremer,
1998). The risk of corruption is probably higher in critical emergency situations if the
general level of corruption in the given country is considered a significant problem
(Schultz and Søreide, 2008). Transparency International, which ranks countries ac-
cording to their perceived level of corruption, has ranked Haiti consistently as one of25
the 10 most corrupt nations in the world (Transparency International, 2009). The poor
local and national governance and debt policies of Haiti, as well as the inability of the
aid sector to efficiently absorb the outpouring of aid, can lead to increased vulnerability






































and real needs of the affected population. Although it is known that corruption is difficult
to control, it is able to be discouraged and by enhancing the response and plan for aid-
ing a country, enhancing development and creating better living standards, corruption
can be reduced.
6 Conclusions5
Haiti had a 2009 GDP (Nominal) of $ 6390 million and a GDP (Nominal PPP) of ap-
proximately $ 11 500 million, with a population below the poverty line of 80 % and still
$ 1000 million in foreign debt even after a $ 1200 million reduction through the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF, 2009). It is one of the 25 poorest countries in the world (IMF,
2010; World Bank, 2010). With a total economic loss (direct and indirect) approaching10
70 % of GDP (PPP) (Daniell et al. 2010b) or even more (121 % of Nominal GDP ac-
cording to the estimate of $ 7754 million of damage, CEPAL, 2010), the 12 January
2010 earthquake will have a significant impact on Haiti for the years to come. There is
no question that Haiti requires aid, and no one wants to delay life-saving interventions
to conduct a study, but making decisions based on political or media pressure rather15
than comprehensive survey of the needs leads to waste (Freschi, 2010). Casualty data
following the 12 January 2010 earthquake in Haiti from many different sources were
used and calibrated by observed building damage states from satellite imagery and
reconnaissance reports to arrive at the most realistic estimate of death tolls. A method-
ology based on a logic tree approach for estimating death toll for the Haiti earthquake20
has been proposed. While death toll is not the only parameter determining the scale
of a disaster, it is often used as a key factor for determining the amount of aid and
reconstruction funds that will be mobilized in the initial period of a disaster. There will
never be a perfect casualty estimate, but a reasonable estimate, not based on sen-
sationalist claims and incomplete information, is required at least by those agencies25
such as OCHA tasked with overall coordination of aid. The death toll of the Haiti earth-






































most reasonable estimate, with a preferred value lying somewhere around 137 000
deaths. This will ultimately serve in better mitigating the impact of natural disasters
on the poor by ensuring that international aid commitments are better matched with
solutions to the limited aid-absorptive capacity in disaster-affected countries. Also, in
the light of increasing allegations of financial impropriety and mismanagement, greater5
transparency and accountability on the part of governments in reporting needs and
allocation of funds they have received are now a necessity.
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Table 1. Building tagging (red, yellow, green) using various methods for the 2010 Haiti Earth-
quake (SNGRD, 2010a; MTPTC, 2011).
UNOSAT Govt. Haiti Govt. Haiti MTMPC/Miyamoto
(Main 11 cities) (Renois) (SNGRD) – USAID Proper
Approx. Red 59 073 (20 %) 280 000 (70 %) 136 593 (34 %) 77 548 (20 %)
Approx. Yellow 51 946 (17 %) Not given 145 715 (37 %) 98 310 (26 %)
Approx. Green 188 238 (63 %) Not given 117 692 (29 %) 205 382 (54 %)






































Table 2. Damage reports adapted over the main cities via red-tagged buildings in the 2010
Haiti earthquake (EC-JRC, 2010a; OCHA, 2010a; MTPTC, 2011).
Area Composition Damage Reports Damage Reports Final assess-
(UNOSAT/UNITAR/ from Haiti ment of
JRC-EC PDNA/ Government, MTMPC-USAID
GEO-CAN) SNGRD etc. – assumed
Carrefour Mod. density urban 8673 (16 %) 978? 11 669 (19 %)
Cite Soleil High density urban 1561 (16 %) 3292 (34 %) 2169 (18 %)
Croix-des-Bouquets Mod. density urban Included in other towns 3438 7772 (15 %)
Delmas 93 High density urban 7826 (17 %) 16 506 (36 %) 10 123 (17 %)
Grand-Goave Mostly rural 689 (19 %) 4950 816 (23 %)
Gressier Low density urban 854 (16 %) 5139 2655 (39 %)
Jacmel Mostly rural 1999 (15 %) 4036 814 (21 %)
Léogâne Urban-rural mixed 8205 (21 %) 17 305 (44 %) 8249 (51 %)
Pétionville Low density urban 2933 (18 %) 6186 (39 %) 5606 (11 %)
Petit-Goave Urban-rural mixed 277 (21 %) – urban 12 638 – total Unk.
Port-au-Prince High density urban 25 159 (24 %) 53 063 (50 %) 25 202 (29 %)
Tabarre Urban-rural mixed 897 (15 %) – urban 453 2320 (11 %)
Other towns Mainly rural and Unknown but assume 24 000 Assumed 10 000
in Ouest and low dens. urban 10 % of 100 000 in other areas
other provinces out of the 100 000







































Table 3. Death tolls for the 2010 Haiti earthquake as spatially disaggregated from various
sources (SNGRD, 2010a; Melissen, 2010; Govt. Haiti, 2011).
Area Population Melissen (2010) Haiti Government Pre-regression
(mid-2009) Death Count including Death Count Melissen (2010)
all death forms including all using distributed
(i.e. buried, entombed, death forms values of other death
cremated etc.) (28 Feb 2010) counts and those
under rubble etc.
Carrefour 465 019 4000 in Carrefour cemetery 12 300 6993
Cite Soleil 241 055 Included in Port-au-Prince 249 249
Croix-des-Bouquets 227 012 Included in 10 000 614 614
Delmas93 359 451 Approx. 7000 in Titanyen 38 636 12 238
and other cemeteries.
Grand-Goave 124 135 18 259 259
Gressier 33 152 292 860 860
Jacmel 170 289 400 389 389
Léogâne 181 709 3364 with a possibility of 3364 3364
up to 5000
Pétionville 342 694 Approx. 3000 in Titanyen 16 302 5244
and other cemeteries
Petit-Goave 157 296 1077 1318 1077
Port-au-Prince 897 859 Main Cemetery: 18 000, 148 772 61 191
Others including Titanyen:
17 000
Tabarre 118 477 Included in 10 000 100 (down 100
from 7000)
Other towns in Ouest Unknown 633 633
and other provinces
Distributed across all 30 000 underneath rubble
and other death methods,
10 000 in other towns
and other forms of death






































Table 4. Logic tree weighting for the final Haiti 2010 death toll estimate between the various
discussed methods.
Death Toll Method Lower Median Upper Weighting (%)
Melissen (2010) 52 000 82 000 92 000 5
Haiti Govt. (SNGRD) (until 11 Jan 2011) 222 570 223 469 230 000 5
Haiti Govt. Statement (12 Jan 2011) 316 000 316 000 316 000 0.5
Bottom-up Approach 138 000 147 000 162 000 15
General rule of thumb 135 000 142 500 150 000 2
Top-down Approach on Haiti Govt. 111 271 127 464 164 124 50
Top-down Approach on Haiti Govt. +30 000 bodies 126 209 144 575 186 157 20
Haiti Govt. Statement adjusted for building error 90 286 101 321 112 356 2.5






































Table 5. Some historical overestimates of earthquake loss after 1900 via CATDAT v5.18.
Earthquake, Country, Year Upper or initial estimate CATDAT Reason for difference
of deaths (combined) Preferred death toll range
Messina, Italy, 1908 150 000–300 000 (Morris, 1909) 85 926 (80 000–90 000) News reports, scale of disaster.
(MRNATHAN, 2009,
Daniell, 2010a)
Xining, China, 1927 200 000 (Bath 1973, EM-DAT) 40 912 (40 900–45 000) Historical confusion
(Gu et al., 1989) with 1920 Haiyuan earthquake
Khait, Tajikistan, 1949 28 000 (Yablokov, 2001) 12 000 (7200–18 000) Difficult to ascertain
(Evans et al., 2009) due to landslide and remoteness
Temuco-Valdivia, Chile, 1960 6000–10 000 (press reports) 1655–2231 Initial scale of disaster,
or 7231 (EM-DAT) (USGS, 2010b) media reporting, errors in
current databases
Tangshan, China, 1976 655 237 (initial govt reports 242 419 (240 000–255 000) Initial scale of disaster
– South China Post, 1977) (Yong et al., 1989)
Izmit, Turkey 1999 40 000 Bodybags ordered (Govt.), 17 434 (17 127–20 000) Initial scale of disaster
45 000 (Marza, 2004) (Erdik, 2000)
Bam, Iran, 2003 41 000–50 000 (ACT International, 26 796 (25 000–30 000) Initial scale of disaster,








































Figure 1. Haiti Death Toll Estimates from Various Sources showing the temporal evolution 2 



































































= Government Range = Melissen (2010) Range = Non-Haiti Based Aid Range 
Fig. 1. Haiti death toll stimates from va ious sources showing the t mporal evolutio (12 Jan-








































Figure 2. Overestimates (as shown as diamonds) and underestimates (as shown as blue 2 
squares) of historical earthquakes compared with the CATDAT best estimate of death toll 3 
(linear line) with a death toll over 1000 since 1900 showing Haiti in bold. (after Daniell, 2011 4 
using Daniell 2003-2013.) 5 
Fig. 2. Overestimates (as shown as diamonds) and underestimates (as shown as blue squares)
of historical earthquakes compared with the CATDAT best estimate of death toll (linear line) with
a death toll over 1000 since 1900 showing Haiti in bold (after Daniell, 2011 using Daniell, 2003–
2013).
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